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referred to as “temporal ventriloquism” (cf. Morein-Zamir et al., 
2003; Recanzone, 2003; Lewald and Guski, 2004). In the area of 
audiovisual speech perception, it has been observed that auditory 
speech has to lag behind matching visual speech, i.e., lip move-
ments, by more than 250 ms for the asynchrony to be perceived 
(Dixon and Spitz, 1980; Conrey and Pisoni, 2006; van Wassenhove 
et al., 2007). In cat and other animals, a temporal window of inte-
gration has been observed in multisensory convergence sites, such 
as the superior colliculus (SC): enhanced spike responses of mul-
tisensory neurons occur when periods of unimodal peak activ-
ity overlap within a certain time range (King and Palmer, 1985; 
Meredith et al., 1987). In orienting responses to a visual–auditory 
stimulus complex, acceleration of saccadic RTs has been observed 
under a multitude of experimental settings within a time win-
dow of 150–250 ms (e.g., Frens et al., 1995; Corneil et al., 2002; 
Diederich and Colonius, 2004, 2008a,b; Colonius et al., 2009; Van 
Wanrooij et al., 2009).
While the ubiquity of the notion of a temporal window is 
evident, estimates of the range differ widely, ranging from 40 to 
600 ms, sometimes even up to 1,500 ms, depending on context. 
Given that these estimates arise from rather different experimental 
paradigms, i.e., judgments of temporal order or simultaneity, sim-
ple manual or saccadic RT, single-cell recordings, these differences 
may not be all that surprising. Nevertheless, this observation casts 
some doubt on the notion of time window proper: Is it simply 
a metaphor, or does it constitute a unifying concept underlying 
multisensory integration dynamics?
INTRODUCTION
Visual–auditory integration manifests itself in different ways, 
e.g., as an increase of the mean number of impulses of a mul-
tisensory neuron relative to unimodal stimulation (Stein and 
Meredith, 1993), acceleration of manual or saccadic reaction time 
(RT, Diederich and Colonius, 1987; Frens et al., 1995), effective 
audiovisual speech integration (van Wassenhove et al., 2007), or in 
improved, or degraded, judgment of temporal order or subjective 
simultaneity of a bimodal stimulus pair (cf. Zampini et al., 2003). 
Within the multisensory research community, the concept of a 
temporal window of integration has been well-described over 20 
years ago (Meredith et al., 1987; Stein and Meredith, 1993) and has 
enjoyed popularity as an important determinant of the dynamics 
of crossmodal integration both at the neural and behavioral levels 
of observation (e.g., Lewald et al., 2001; Meredith, 2002; Lewald 
and Guski, 2003; Spence and Squire, 2003; Colonius and Diederich, 
2004a; Wallace et al., 2004; Bell et al., 2005, 2006; Navarra et al., 
2005; Romei et al., 2007; Rowland and Stein, 2007; Rowland et al., 
2007; van Wassenhove et al., 2007; Musacchia and Schroeder, 2009; 
Powers III et al., 2009; Royal et al., 2009). On a descriptive level, 
the time-window hypothesis holds that information from different 
sensory modalities must not be too far apart in time so that integra-
tion into a multisensory perceptual unit may occur. In particular, 
when a sensory event simultaneously produces both sound and 
light, we usually do not notice any temporal disparity between 
the two sensory inputs (within a distance of up to 20–26 m), even 
though the sound arrives with a delay, a phenomenon sometimes 
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In this paper, we address this question by considering “time 
window of integration” from a decision-theoretic point of view. 
It has been recognized that integrating crossmodal information 
implies a decision about whether or not two (or more) sensory cues 
originate from the same event, i.e., have a common cause (Stein 
and Meredith, 1993; Koerding et al., 2007). Several research groups 
have suggested that multisensory integration follows rules based on 
optimal Bayesian inference procedures, more or less closely (Ernst, 
2005, for a review). Here we extend this approach by determin-
ing a temporal window of optimal width: An inﬁ  nitely large time 
window will lead to mandatory integration, a zero-width time win-
dow will rule out integration entirely. From a decision-making 
point of view, however, neither case is likely to be optimal in the 
long run. In a noisy, complex, and potentially hostile environment 
exhibiting multiple sources of sensory stimulation, the issue of 
whether or not two given stimuli of different modality arise from 
a common source may be critical for an organism. For example, 
in a predator–prey situation, when the potential prey perceives a 
sudden movement in the dark, it may be vital to recognize whether 
this is caused by a predator or a harmless wind gust. If the visual 
information is accompanied by some vocalization from a similar 
direction, it may be adequate to respond to the potential threat by 
assuming that the visual and auditory information are caused by 
the same source, i.e., to perform multisensory integration leading 
to a speeded escape reaction. On the other hand, in such a rich 
dynamic environment it may also be disadvantageous, e.g., leading 
to a depletion of resources, or even hazardous, to routinely combine 
information associated with sensory events which – in reality – may 
be entirely independent and unrelated to each other.
TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL TIME WINDOW OF INTEGRATION
First, we introduce the basic decision situation for determining 
a time window of integration. The main part of this paper is a 
proposal for deriving an optimal estimate of time-window width. 
We conclude with an illustration of the approach to the time-win-
dow-of-integration (TWIN) model introduced in Colonius and 
Diederich (2004a) and describe an experiment to be conducted to 
test the viability of this proposal.
THE BASIC DECISION SITUATION
The basic decision situation just described can be presented in a 
simpliﬁ  ed and schematic manner by the following Table 1 (“payoff 
matrix”). It deﬁ  nes the gain (or cost) function U associated with 
the states of nature (C) and the action (I) of audiovisual integration:
Variable C indicates whether visual and auditory stimulus informa-
tion are generated by a common source (C = 1), i.e., an audiovisual 
event, or by two separate sources (C = 2), i.e., auditory and visual 
stimuli are unrelated to each other. Variable I indicates whether 
or not integration occurs (I = 1 or I = 0, respectively). The values 
U11 and U20 correspond to correct decisions and will in general be 
assumed to be positive numbers, while U21 and U10, corresponding 
to incorrect decisions, will be negative. The organism’s task is to 
balance these costs and beneﬁ  ts of multisensory integration by an 
appropriate optimizing strategy (cf. Koerding et al., 2007).
We assume that a priori probabilities for the events {C = i}i=1,2 
exist, with P(C = 1) = 1 − P(C = 2). In general, an optimal strat-
egy may involve many different aspects of the empirical situation, 
like spatial and temporal contiguity, or more abstract aspects, like 
semantic relatedness of the information from different modali-
ties (cf. van Attefeldt et al., 2007). For example, Sato et al. (2007) 
take into account both spatial and temporal conditions simulating 
performance in an audiovisual localization task. Although a more 
general formulation of our approach is possible, here we limit the 
analysis to temporal information alone because this sufﬁ  ces for 
the application of our decision-theoretic setup in the context of 
the TWIN model (see Application to TWIN Model Framework). 
In other words, the only perceptual evidence utilized by the organ-
ism is the temporal disparity between the “arrival times” of the 
unimodal signals (to be deﬁ  ned below), sometimes supplemented 
by information about the identity of the ﬁ  rst-terminating modal-
ity. Thus, computation of the optimal time window will be based 
on the prior probability of a common cause and the likelihood of 
temporal disparities between the unimodal signals. Note that our 
approach does not claim existence of a high-level decision-making 
entity contemplating different action alternatives. We only assume 
that an organism’s behavior can be assessed as being consistent – or 
not – with an optimal strategy for the time window width.
REDUNDANT TARGETS: AN EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM FOR 
CROSSMODAL INTERACTION
For concreteness, we outline an experimental paradigm where 
crossmodal interaction is typically observed. In the redundant target 
paradigm (sometimes referred to as redundant signals or divided-
attention paradigm), stimuli from different modalities are presented 
simultaneously or with a certain interstimulus interval (ISI), and 
participants are instructed to respond by pressing a response button 
as soon as a stimulus is detected, or by a saccadic eye movement 
away from the ﬁ  xation point toward the stimulus detected ﬁ  rst. 
Obviously, from the RT measured in a single experimental trial one 
cannot tell whether or not multisensory integration has occurred 
in that instance. However, evaluating average response times under 
invariant experimental conditions permits conclusions about the 
existence and direction of crossmodal effects. For example, the time 
to respond in the crossmodal condition is typically faster than in 
either of the unimodal conditions (e.g., Diederich and Colonius, 
1987, 2008a,b; Frens et al., 1995).
INTRODUCING THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
For each stimulus presented in a given modality, we introduce a non-
negative random variable representing the peripheral processing 
time (“arrival time,” for short), that is, the time it takes to transmit 
the stimulus information through a modality-speciﬁ  c sensory chan-
nel up to the ﬁ  rst site where crossmodal interaction may occur.
Let A, V denote the auditory and visual arrival time, respec-
tively. For the redundant target task, the absolute difference in 
arrival times, T = |V − A|, is again a non-negative random vari-
able assumed to represent the empirical evidence available to the 
Table 1 | Payoff matrix for the basic decision situation.
 Integration  (I = 1)  No integration (I = 0)
Common source (C = 1)  U11  U10
Separate sources (C = 2)  U21  U20Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 11  |  3
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This set of numbers does not necessarily have the intuitive form of 
a “window”, i.e., of an interval of the reals. However, if L(t) is a strictly 
decreasing function, the decision rule can by written equivalently as
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the optimal window is deﬁ  ned by all arrival time differences shorter 
than t0. Note that, since L−1 is strictly decreasing, increasing the prior 
probability P(C = 1) for a common cause will make the optimal 
window larger, as expected.
The window size t0 also depends on the U-values in the payoff 
matrix as follows. Keeping the (negative) values U21 and U10 ﬁ  xed, 
an increase in U11, (the gain of integrating when there is a common 
cause) will decrease the ratio of U-differences occurring in the deci-
sion rule and leads to an increase of optimal window width; on the 
other hand, an increase in U20 (the gain of not integrating when there 
is no common cause) will increase the ratio of U-differences leading 
to a narrowing of the window. Both effects are to be expected, and a 
symmetric argument holds for the remaining values U21 and U10.
An exact value of t0 can only be determined for explicit values 
of P(C = 1), the payoff matrix entries, and the likelihood ratio 
function. A plausible scenario for a decreasing likelihood ratio, 
illustrated in the example below, is to assume that f(t|C = 1) has a 
maximum at t = 0 and then decreases, i.e., higher arrival time differ-
ences become less likely under a common cause, whereas f(t|C = 2) 
is constant across all t values that may occur in a trial.
EXAMPLE: EXPONENTIAL-UNIFORM LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS
For a common source, we assume an exponential law likelihood,
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where µ > 0. Thus, the likelihood for a zero arrival time difference 
is largest (equal to µ) and decreases exponentially. For two separate 
sources, we assume a uniform law,
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Thus, within the observation interval (0, t1), any arrival time 
difference occurs with the same likelihood. For 0 ≤ t < t1, the likeli-
hood ratio becomes
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which is a function monotonically decreasing in t. To simplify mat-
ters, we set
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 decision  mechanism. For a realization t of T, we deﬁ  ne the likelihood 
function f(t|C), where f denotes the probability mass function or, 
if it exists, the density function of T given C. The distribution of T 
will generally depend on the speciﬁ  c ISI value in the experiment 
but there is no need to make that explicit for now. Using Bayes’ rule, 
we immediately have the posterior probability of a common cause 
given the occurrence of an arrival time difference t,
P Ct
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Introducing the likelihood ratio
L(t) = f(t|C = 1)/f(t|C = 2),
implies a well-known identity (e.g., Green and Swets, 1974),
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between the posterior odds in favor of a common event after evi-
dence t has occurred (left-hand side), and the likelihood ratio times 
the prior odds in favor of a common event (right-hand side).
DECISION RULE: MAXIMIZE THE EXPECTED VALUE OF U
On each trial, in order to maximize the expected value E[U] of 
function U in the payoff matrix (Table 1), the decision-making 
mechanism should choose that action alternative (to integrate or 
not) which contributes, on the average, more to E[U] than the other 
action alternative (Egan, 1975). Given the available empirical evi-
dence, i.e., the speciﬁ  c value t of random arrival time difference T, 
and assuming knowledge of the prior probability and the likelihood 
ratio, the expected payoff when integration is performed is
E UtI P C t U P C t U [| , ] ( | ) ( | ) , == = + = 11 2 11 21   (2)
while the expected payoff for not integrating is
E UtI P C t U P C t U [| , ] ( | ) ( | ) . == = + = 02 1 20 10   (3)
Thus, integration should be performed if and only if E[U|t,I = 
1] > E[U|t,I = 0] holds; using the right-hand terms in Eqs 2 and 3 
in this inequality gives, after some rearrangement, the following 
decision rule:
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Using Eq. 1 to replace the posterior odds, the decision rule may 
be written in terms of the likelihood ratio of the observation t:
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THE OPTIMAL TIME WINDOW OF INTEGRATION
The decision rule just derived implicitly deﬁ  nes a time window of 
integration that is optimal in the sense of maximizing E[U]: it is 
simply the set of all values of arrival time differences t satisfying 
the inequality in the decision rule (Eq. 5).Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 11  |  4
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Thus, according to the optimal decision rule, audiovisual 
  integration should be performed if and only if
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Figure 1 illustrates the optimal time window width as a function 
of the prior probability P(C = 1) and the exponential parameter µ.
Increasing prior probability of a common cause implies that the 
optimal window width increases as well; moreover, for a ﬁ  xed and 
not too small prior probability, this optimal width decreases as the 
likelihood for a zero arrival time difference (µ) becomes larger. The 
value of t0 will be positive for 1/(1 + t1µ) < P(C = 1) ≤ 1. Moreover, 
window width will be 0 for P(C = 1) = 1/(1 + t1µ). Thus, in this 
example and, in fact, whenever the likelihood ratio converges to 
a non-zero value for t → 0, the prediction is that the window will 
disappear for a small enough value of the prior, thereby providing 
a possibly strong model test. (Note that the crossing of the curves 
is merely an artifact of having to set the observation interval to a 
ﬁ  nite value.)
APPLICATION TO TWIN MODEL FRAMEWORK
We demonstrate the proposed approach within the frame-
work  of the TWIN model for saccadic RTs (Colonius and 
Diederich, 2004a).
The model postulates that a crossmodal stimulus triggers a race 
mechanism in the very early, peripheral sensory pathways which 
is then followed by a compound stage of converging subprocesses 
that comprise neural integration of the input and preparation of 
a response. Note that this second stage is deﬁ  ned by default: it 
includes all subsequent, possibly temporally overlapping, processes 
that are not part of the peripheral processes in the ﬁ  rst stage. The 
central assumption of the model concerns the temporal conﬁ  gu-
ration needed for multisensory integration to occur: Multisensory 
integration occurs only if the peripheral processes of the ﬁ  rst stage 
all terminate within a given temporal interval, the “time window of 
integration” (TWIN assumption). Thus, the window acts as a ﬁ  lter 
determining whether afferent information delivered from differ-
ent sensory organs is registered close enough in time to trigger 
multisensory integration. Passing the ﬁ  lter is necessary but not 
sufﬁ  cient for crossmodal interaction to occur, the reason being that 
the amount of interaction may also depend on many other aspects 
of the stimulus set, like spatial conﬁ  guration of the stimuli. The 
amount of crossmodal interaction manifests itself in an increase 
or decrease of second stage processing time.
Thus, the basic tenet of the TWIN framework is the priority of 
temporal proximity over any other type of proximity, rather than 
assuming a joint spatiotemporal window of integration. Although 
this two-stage assumption clearly oversimpliﬁ  es matters, it affords 
quite a number of experimentally testable predictions, many of 
which have found empirical support in recent studies (cf. Diederich 
and Colonius, 2007a,b, 2008a,b). It is also important to keep in 
mind that the two-stage TWIN assumption is not a precondition 
for applying the optimal time window decision strategy developed 
in the previous section.
For the redundant target paradigm and a visual–auditory stimu-
lus complex, ﬁ  rst stage processing time S1 is deﬁ  ned as
S1 = min(V, A),
with V and A denoting the peripheral visual and auditory arrival 
times, respectively. According to the TWIN assumption,
P(I = 1) = P(A < V < A + ω) + P(V < A < V + ω)
     =   P(|V − A| < ω),
where non-negative constant ω denotes the width of the time 
window of integration and, as before, I = 1 is the event that mul-
tisensory integration occurs. Given the prior probability and 
(strictly decreasing) likelihood functions, it is now straightforward 
to implement the optimal decision rule derived above by setting 
ω equal to the value of t0 as deﬁ  ned in the expression following 
In Eq. 6.
The computation of the probability of multisensory integration 
and the deﬁ  nition of ﬁ  rst-stage processing time in the crossmodal 
condition vary somewhat depending on the experimental paradigm 
(cf., Diederich and Colonius, 2008a). The TWIN framework makes 
a number of experimentally testable predictions without having to 
specify probability distributions for the random variables in the 
ﬁ  rst stage, V and A (cf. Diederich and Colonius, 2007a,b, 2008a,b). 
However, in order to ﬁ  t TWIN to observed mean (saccadic) RTs, 
some probability distributions must be postulated and their param-
eters estimated. Reasonably good ﬁ  ts have been obtained assum-
ing exponential distributions for these variables (Diederich and 
Colonius, 2007a,b, 2008a,b). The width of the time window, ω, 
is another numerical parameter that can be estimated from the 
data. For example, Diederich et al. (2008) found window width to 
differ between young and old age groups. Thus, it seems feasible in 
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FIGURE 1 | Example (see Example: Exponential-Uniform Likelihood 
Functions) with exponential-uniform likelihood functions: Optimal 
window width increases as a function of the a priori probability of a 
common event. The increase becomes less steep by increasing the 
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principle to perform an experiment probing whether subjects are in 
fact able to adapt their window width to changing environmental 
conditions in an optimal manner.
A SUGGESTED EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
The ﬁ  rst goal of an empirical validation of the proposed approach 
is to show that an appropriate experimental manipulation has an 
effect on RT that is consistent with the hypothesis of a time window 
of integration changing its width according to the optimal deci-
sion rule derived above. Having demonstrated such a consistency, 
however, does not prove that the optimal time window is in fact 
determined by employing the computational principles laid out in 
Section “Towards an Optimal Time Window of Integration” (for 
an extended discussion of conceiving Bayesian decision theory as 
a process model, see Maloney and Mamassian, 2009).
We assume that, in a reduced laboratory situation with simple 
visual and auditory stimuli, spatial contiguity is the main determi-
nant of perceiving visual and auditory information as a common 
crossmodal event, given a small enough arrival time difference. 
This premise is supported by the observation that facilitation of 
(saccadic) RT is maximal when visual and auditory stimuli appear 
at the same position in space and that it decreases, or even turns 
into inhibition, when spatial distance increases (Frens et al., 1995; 
Corneil and Munoz, 1996; Colonius and Arndt, 2001; Whitchurch 
and Takahashi, 2006). Obviously, this scheme would not work in 
a (localization) task where a joint spatiotemporal window would 
be most plausible.
This suggests using a simple setup with one visual and one audi-
tory stimulus appearing at a horizontal position to the left or right 
of the ﬁ  xation point. The stimuli either appear at the same position 
(ipsilateral condition, for common event) or at opposite positions 
(contralateral condition, for separate events). Variables that can be 
controlled for within an experimental block, or across multiple blocks, 
are the ISI between visual and auditory stimulus and the frequency 
of ipsilateral vs. contralateral presentations, randomized with respect 
to laterality. According to the proposed decision rule, there are three 
factors by which one can manipulate the optimal window width: (i) 
the prior odds in favor of a common event, (ii) the likelihood ratio, 
and (iii) the payoff matrix. We consider each in turn.
PRIOR ODDS
In this setup, a common event, C = 1, corresponds to the visual 
and auditory stimulus being presented ipsilaterally, left or right of 
ﬁ  xation point. Thus, prior odds in favor of a common event are 
easily manipulated by changing the relative frequency of ipsilateral 
vs. contralateral presentations. Keeping all other conditions in the 
setup invariant, the prediction is that, e.g., prior odds of 4:1 in 
favor of a common event within a session should lead to a wider 
window of integration, entailing faster mean RTs, than prior odds 
not favoring either type of event. If, however, the odds for a com-
mon event are approaching 0, it may be difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd evidence 
that integration is getting ruled out entirely.
LIKELIHOOD RATIO
Arrival time differences are non-observable entities. Nevertheless, 
one can indirectly manipulate their distribution by changing the 
ISI: large ISI values should generate, on average, large arrival time 
differences and this will have a discernable effect as long as the 
variability of the arrival times is not too large. In the above exam-
ple of exponential-uniform likelihood functions (see Example: 
Exponential-Uniform Likelihood Functions) for the arrival time 
differences, the likelihood ratio L(t) in favor of integration was 
large for small values of arrival time difference t and decreased with 
increasing t. One possible manipulation would be to reverse this 
relation by more frequently presenting ipsilateral stimuli with large 
ISIs. The non-trivial prediction is that increasing the likelihood for 
large arrival time differences will lead to a larger window of inte-
gration and, thereby, to faster reactions. This prediction has in fact 
been conﬁ  rmed in Navarra et al. (2005), albeit for a temporal order 
judgment (TOJ) task. Monitoring asynchronous audiovisual speech 
participants required a longer interval between the auditory and 
visual stimuli in order to perceive their temporal order correctly, 
suggesting a widening of the temporal window for audiovisual 
integration, presumably as a consequence of increasing the likeli-
hood for non-zero arrival time differences under a common cause 
(for TOJ tasks, see Discussion).
PAYOFF MATRIX
Increasing the gains for integrating visual and auditory informa-
tion when they derive from a common event, and/or decreasing the 
costs when they don’t, should lead to a larger window of integration 
and, thus, to shorter average RTs. This can be achieved in the above 
setting through appropriate instruction, using different response 
deadlines and reward settings.
An important caveat in planning and evaluating empirical 
validation of the time window hypothesis concerns the plastic-
ity of its width. It is not yet clear how much stimulus exposition 
is needed to establish, e.g., the prior probability of a common 
event, and how quickly changes in the experimental conditions 
will affect the setting of the time window width. We are not aware 
of any relevant ﬁ  ndings in the realm of RTs, but recent results on 
the perception of audiovisual simultaneity suggest a high degree 
of ﬂ  exibility in multisensory temporal processing (Vroomen 
et al., 2004; Keetels and Vroomen, 2007; Powers III et al., 2009; 
Roseboom et al., 2009).
DISCUSSION
The spatiotemporal window of integration has become a widely 
accepted concept in multisensory research: crossmodal informa-
tion falling within this window is (highly likely to be) integrated, 
whereas information falling outside is not (e.g., Meredith et al., 
1987; Meredith, 2002; Colonius and Diederich, 2004a; Powers III 
et al., 2009). The aim of this paper was to further probe this idea 
in a RT setting. Making explicit assumptions about the arrival time 
difference between peripheral sensory processing times triggered by 
a crossmodal stimulus set, we derive a decision rule that determines 
an optimal window width as a function of (i) the prior odds in favor 
of a common multisensory source, (ii) the likelihood of arrival 
time differences, and (iii) the payoff for making correct or wrong 
decisions. Thus, our approach is in line with the – by now – well-
established framework for modeling multisensory integration as 
(nearly) optimal decision making (e.g., Anastasio et al., 2000; Ernst 
and Banks, 2002; Hillis et al., 2002; Battaglia et al., 2003; Alais and 
Burr, 2004; Colonius and Diederich, 2004b; Wallace et al., 2004; Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 11  |  6
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multisensory neurons in the deep layers of SC, they found that 
the minimum multisensory response latency was shorter than 
the minimum unisensory response latency. This initial response 
enhancement (IRE), in the ﬁ  rst 40 ms of the response, was typi-
cally superadditive and may have a more or less direct effect 
on reaction speed observed in behavioral experiments. What 
remains to be shown, however, is whether IRE generalizes to a 
situation where the unimodal inputs do not arrive at the neuron 
very close in time and, more generally, how these properties at the 
individual neuron level can be combined – under possible corti-
cal inﬂ  uences – to generate the time window behavior observed 
in behavioral experiments.
Given the growing support of the hypothesis that coherence 
of oscillatory responses at the level of primary sensory cortices 
may play a crucial role in multisensory processing (Lakatos et al., 
2007; Senkowski et al., 2008; Chandrasekaran and Ghazanfar, 
2009), a hypothetical relation between window width and oscil-
latory activity has recently been derived by Lakatos, Schroeder, 
and colleagues from certain rules about neuronal oscillations 
(see Schroeder et al., 2008, pp. 107–108 for a more complete 
description): (1) neuronal oscillations reflect synchronized 
fluctuation of a local neuronal ensemble between high and low 
excitability states, i.e., “ideal” and “worst” phases for stimulus 
processing; (2) “if two stimuli occur with a reasonably predict-
able lag, the first stimulus can reset an oscillation to its ideal 
phase and thus enhance the response to the second stimulus” 
(Schroeder et al., 2008); in particular, attended stimuli in one 
sensory modality may reset the phase of ongoing oscillations in 
primary cortices not only within that modality but also within 
another modality (see Lakatos et al., 2009); (3) oscillatory phase 
modulates subsequent stimulus processing: “…after reset, inputs 
that arrive within the ideal (high-excitability) phase evoke 
amplified responses, whereas the responses to inputs that arrive 
slightly later during the worst phase are suppressed” (Lakatos 
et al., 2009); (4) oscillations exist at different frequencies, from 
below 1 Hz to over 200 Hz and tend to be phase-amplitude 
coupled in a hierarchical fashion (Lakatos et al., 2005). To sum-
marize, if one can identify the phase an oscillations is reset to by, 
say a visual stimulus, and its frequency, then one can in principle 
predict when a temporal window of high excitability (or low 
excitability) will occur (cf. Schroeder et al., 2008, p. 427). The 
different oscillation frequencies in lower and higher cortical 
structures may in fact contribute to the multitude of different 
window widths that have been observed in behavioral stud-
ies. Although the behavioral consequences of these oscillatory 
mechanism and their relation to optimal decision-making prin-
ciples remain speculative at this point, these neurophysiological 
findings are intriguing and suggest a variety of experimental 
studies of crossmodal behavior.
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Shams et al., 2005; Roach et al., 2006; Sato et al., 2007; Beierholm 
et al., 2008; Ma and Pouget, 2008; Di Luca et al., 2009). However, to 
our knowledge, none of these studies has considered RT as observ-
able variable.
The line of investigation suggested here is not limited to the 
redundant targets paradigm but can easily be extended to the 
focused attention paradigm where subjects are instructed to only 
respond to stimuli from a target modality and to ignore stimuli 
from another, non-target modality (Corneil et al., 2002; Hairston 
et al., 2003; Diederich and Colonius, 2008a; Van Wanrooij et al., 
2009). In this case, arrival time differences can take on either 
positive or negative values depending on which modality is 
registered ﬁ  rst, and the likelihood function must be deﬁ  ned 
both at the left and right side of the zero point of simultane-
ity. A straightforward and computationally simple extension of 
the exponential-uniform example is to replace the exponential 
by a – possibly asymmetric – Laplace distribution (e.g., Kotz, 
et al., 2001).
The notion of a time window as considered here must be dis-
tinguished from an apparently closely related concept, the “time 
window of simultaneity.” The latter refers to the maximum time 
interval between two stimuli that leads to a subject’s judgment 
of perceiving the two stimuli as “simultaneous” or, in the case 
of TOJs, i.e., “stimulus x occurs before stimulus y”, an appropri-
ate deﬁ  nition in terms of threshold is available. Although direct 
estimates of the time window of simultaneity derived from such 
judgments tasks with stimuli from different modalities often come 
close to those observed in comparable RT experiments (e.g., Burr 
et al., 2009; Roseboom et al., 2009), it has been argued that, since 
very different demands are placed on the observer by judgments 
of simultaneity (or temporal order) compared to the RT task, the 
underlying mechanisms may also be substantially different (cf. 
Sternberg and Knoll, 1973; for discussions, see Tappe et al., 1994; 
Neumann and Niepel, 2004). For example, in the saccadic RT task 
participants are encouraged to respond as quickly as possible 
after a stimulus has been presented but are also asked to avoid 
anticipatory responses or false alarms. In the judgment tasks, 
no such time pressure exists and false alarms may not even be 
deﬁ  nable. Nevertheless, it has recently been shown by Miller and 
Schwarz (2006) that one can account for dissociations of RT and 
TOJ by a common quantitative model assuming different, pos-
sibly optimal criterion settings. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
an extension of our decision-theoretic approach to describe an 
optimal time window of simultaneity for stimuli from different 
modalities should be feasible, and this issue certainly requires 
further scrutiny.
Results on the neural underpinnings of the time window of 
integration are, as yet, rather scarce. A promising direction has 
been taken by Rowland and colleagues (Rowland et al., 2007; 
Rowland and Stein, 2008). The classic way of assessing mul-
tisensory response enhancement by the change in the mean 
number of impulses over the entire duration of the response 
(of a single neuron) is a useful overall measure, but it is insensi-
tive to the timing of the multisensory interactions. Therefore, 
they developed methods to obtain, and compare, the temporal 
proﬁ  le of the response to uni- and crossmodal stimulation. For Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 11  |  7
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